Ray Keith Sudbury and Ruth Jean Sudbury v. Olaf Theodore Stevensen, Jr., and Barbara Ann Stevensen : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Ray Keith Sudbury and Ruth Jean Sudbury v. Olaf
Theodore Stevensen, Jr., and Barbara Ann
Stevensen : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bridwell, Reynolds & Cuthbert; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sudbury v. Stevensen, No. 9220 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3626
Case :K o. 9:220 
IN THE .SUPREME COURT 
·of the 
STATE OFprrft E D 
J \ 1 N 2 rl 19 60 
-····-·--ci;;k:--s~?~~;;.;;--c~~ri:--iit~h---·-.. 
RAY ICEITH SUDBURY, and RUTH 
~lEAN SUDBURY, 
Platntvffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
OLi\}_, THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR., 
a11d B1\RBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Defendants .and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPE.LLANTS 
BRIDWELL, REYNOLDS & 
c·UTHBERT 
Attorneys for Appellants 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of Facts -----------······------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Sta tern en t of Points _____________________________________________________ ----------------_____ 6 
Argument 
POIN'T I. THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NOT 
IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND THA'T 
THE CONTRACT WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING 
IS CONTRARY TO 'THE EVIDENCE WHICH IS UN-
CONTRADICTED THAT DEFENDANTS WERE DE-
LINQUEN'T A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN P A YMEN'TS..... 7 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT, FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTIRELY IG-
NORES 'THE COVENANT OF DEFENDANTS NOT 
'TO SUE NOR DEFEND ON THE GROUND OF FOR-
FEITURE. ____ __ __ _ _ ____ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ __ ____ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _____ _ _ _ _ ___ ____ __ __ _ _ __ _ __ 9 
POINT III. THE JUDGMENT,,O·F THE TRIAL COURT 
TI-IAT 'THE FORFEITURE PROVISION OF 'THE 
CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE AS A lVIATTER 
OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS.____________________________________________________ 13 
POINT IV. THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT 
ACCELERATE THE CONTRACT BALANCE AND 
THAT DEFENDANTS MADE A VALID TENDER 
ARE IMMATERIAL AND CON'TRARY TO 'THE EVI-
D E N·CE. _________________________________________________________ --------------------------- 21 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAK-
ING AND ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUP-
PORT ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
ME N'T. _______________________ . _____ ---------- __________ -- ______________________ . ___ ____ __ ___ 22 
Conc'l usi on _______________________________ .. ____________ .. -----.--- _______ .. _ .. -- __ .... _____ .... _. _ _ _ 2 3 
CASES CITED 
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P 2d 623 ______________________________ 14 
McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Company, (Idaho 
1960) 349 p 2d 986 ........ ---········----------------------------------------------- 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-('Continued) 
Page 
Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P 2d 712 ________________________________ 14, 19 
J. R. Simplot Company v. Chambers (Idaho 1960), 350 P 2d 
211 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
12 Am. Jur., p. 509, Contracts, Section 16------------------------------------ 11 
12 Am. J ur ., Contracts, Section 172---------------------------------------------- 12 
19 Am. J ur. 102, Equity, Section 93-------------------------------------------- 13 
45 Am. J ur., Release, Section 3---------------------------------------------------- 10 
53 Am. Jur., Trials, Section 1133 ____________________________________________________ 22 
Restatement of Law of Contracts, Section 405____________________________ 10 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure __________________________________ 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
·of the 
S~TATE OF UTAH 
RA-y l(EITH SUDBURY, and RUTfi 
.J }~A.X SUDBURY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR., 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Defendants .and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Case No. 
9220 
Prior to June, 1958, Plaintiffs and Defendants were 
partners, conducting a business known as "Ollie's Ter-
race Room" in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs acquired 
their one-half (%) interest in that partnership from 
Defendants by paying to Defendants the sum of $42,-
500.00 (Deposition Keith Sudbury, page 3, line 8). 
In June, 1958, the parties agreed in writing for the 
sale of Plaintiffs' partnership interest back to Defend-
ants for the lesser sum of $31,608.41. A copy of that 
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agree1nent, the subject of this suit, is attached to Plain-
tiffs' complaint as Exhibit "A." An unpaid contract bal-
ance of $25,408.41 was to be liquidated by Defendants 
in weekly installments of $100.00 each, com1nencing 
September 1, 1958, three 1nonths after the contract was 
signed. 
In addition to this first three month period without 
payment, Defendants were accorded a cumulative fifteen 
week grace period, from and after September 1, 1958 
(Paragraph III C, Exhibit "A"). 
The provisions of the contract pertaining to security 
and default are of prime importance to the ease and 
provide as follows: 
"SECURITY FOR PERFORMANCE: 
v. 
That it is agreed that as security for perform-
ance of the payment of money herein specified 
to be made to SELLERS that BUYERS shall 
execute a blanket chattel1nortgage upon all equip-
ment and tenants' improvements in and upon 
those premises that have been used for the con-
duct of the Limited Partnership herein referred 
to, which mortgage it is understood and agreed 
shall be considered a second mortgage as to the 
mortgage that BUYERS presently contemplate 
entering into to obtain financing of said business; 
that it is understood and agreed that the equip-
ment and fixtures to be 1nortgaged to SELLERS 
under the terms of this agreement may be traded 
or replaced by BUYERS without first obtaining 
consent of SELLERS, provided that none of such 
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equip1nent is disposed of by BUYERS for the 
sole purpose of raising capital or satisfying 
creditors. 
DEFAULT: 
VI. 
That it is agreed that in the event of BUY-
ERS' failure to pay to SELLERS the sums due 
then1 under the terms of this agreement that 
SELLERS n1ay, at their option, elect to proceed 
in either one or the other of the following desig-
nated manners: 
A. }r!ORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: SELL-
ERS rnay, at their option, declare the \vhole of the 
unpaid balance under the tenns of this agreen1ent 
at once due and payable and proceed to collect 
same and foreclose their security herein given, 
it being understood and agreed in such event, 
ho\vever, that SELLERS shall have no rights 
against BUYERS beyond BUYERS' assets that 
may be represented by the furniture, fixtures, ten-
ants' improvements, and leases up·on the premises 
herein referred to, and it is agreed that in the 
event of election to foreclose as in this paragraph 
stated, SELLERS may sell any of said property 
at public or private sale and retain the full pro-
ceeds thereof as their own in discharge of any 
remaining obligation of BUYERS to SELLERS. 
B. FORFEITURE: SELLERS, alternative 
to foreclosure as above specified, may take all of 
BUYERS' right, title and interest in and to said 
business contemplated by the terms of this agree-
ment to the full exclusion of all right, title and 
interest of BUYERS in and to any of said prop-
erty and the business represented thereby in full 
discharge of any remaining obligations, and in 
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such event SELLERS may hold same as their own 
and operate said business in the manner that they 
rnay deem desirable, being responsible, neverthe-
less, to the creditors of BUYERS as said credi-
tors' rights may appear as provided by law. 
That as an express and integral part of the 
consideration of the terms of this agreement, and 
in consideration of SELLERS' consenting that 
BUYERS' assets shall not be amenable to process 
by SELLERS in the event of default by BUY-
ERS, that BUYERS hereby covenant and agree 
that in the event of default and an election by 
SELLEI{S to proceed under the terms of the fore-
going forfeiture provision that BUYERS will 
never raise nor assert as a defense to any such 
action defense of forfeiture, and they hereby ex-
pressly waive and covenant not to claim as their 
own any rights in any of said property nor rights 
to refunds of any moneys that may be paid under 
the terms of this agreement, and BUYERS cove-
nant that they will not sue upon theory of forfeit-
ure nor assert said theory either by way of 
counterclaim, affirmative defense or offset in any 
action that may be brought by any of the parties 
to this agreement; that each party to tlris agree-
ment understands that Courts do not favor for-
feitures, but that each party consents that an in-
dispensable part of the consideration for the 
terms of this agreement is that BUYERS cove-
nant not to sue or defend upon the theory of for-
feiture and they do hereby expressly ·w .. aive and 
consent not to assert such right.'' 
At the time the agreement between the parties was 
negotiated, the provisions quoted above were specifically 
and fully discussed by Keith Sudbury, one of the Plain-
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tiffs, and 'rheodore Olaf Stevenson, one of the Defend-
ants ( J)eposition l(eith Sudbury, page 38, line 30 through 
page -t-1, line 15). No chatteln1ortgage was ever executed. 
No paYJnent was made on the contract by Defendants 
until payrnent of $300.00 on December 8, 1958, which was 
at the end of the fifteen weeks grace period. The $300.00 
\Vas for the payments that were due Septernber 1, 8 and 
15, 1958. 
On January 2, 1959, Defendants paid $1,000.00 for 
payments due for September 22, 1958 through November 
24, 1958 inclusive. No other payments "\vere 1nade until 
l\larch 16, 1959; thereafter all payn1ents were made fif-
teen "\veeks after their due dates and on the last day of 
the fifteen weeks grace period (Ex. P-3). 
On August 10, 1959, Defendants gave Plaintiffs two 
checks in the amounts of $100.00 and $200.00 respectively. 
The $200.00 check was for payments due April 20, and 
27, 1959. The $100.00 check, postdated to August 17, 
1959, was for the installment due l\1ay 4, 1959. 
Both of those checks were dishonored by Defendants' 
bank. Because of the refusal to honor the checks, De-
fendants were then delinquent a total of eighteen pay-
ments totalling $1,800.00. 
Plaintiffs gave Defendants written notice on August 
17, 1959 that they would accept no further installment 
payments and were accelerating the payments. Defend-
ants were told that there was a balance due Plaintiffs of 
$23,506.51 which Plaintiffs would expect a short time 
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after Defendants returned from Europe so that it 'vould 
not he necessary for Plaintiffs to foreclose Defendants 
equipment or take over the business (Exhibit P_-4). 
Thereafter on September 1, 1959, Defendants at-
tempted to pay $500.00, purportedly tn bring the con-
tract payments current. That sum was refused by Plain-
tiffs and this lawsuit resulted (Exhibit P -5). 
Defendants filed no ans\ver in the case. The case 
'vas heard by the trial court on motions for summary 
judgment. Defendants we-re granted su1nmary judgment 
against Plaintiffs, and this ap·peal results. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT 'THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NOT IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE CONTRACT 
WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING IS ·CONTRARY 'TO THE 
EVIDENCE WHICH IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT DE-
FENDANTS WERE DELINQUENT A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN 
PAYMEN'TS. 
POINT TWO 
THE JUDGMENT, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
T·HE TRIAL CO·URT ENTIRELY IGNORES THE COVE-
NAN'T OF DEFENDANTS NOIT TO SUE NOR DEFEND ON 
THE GR.OUND OF FORFEITURE. 
POINT THREE 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE 
FORFEITURE P·RO·VISION OF THE ·CONTRA·CT IS UN-
ENF·OR.CEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS. 
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POIN'T FOUR 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ACCELERATE 'THE 
CON'TRACT BALANCE AND THAT DEFENDANTS MADE 
A VALID 'TENDER ARE IMMATERIAL AND CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING AND 
ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS CON-
CLUSIONS O·F LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
ARGlT1\fENT 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT 'THAT DE·FENDANTS WERE NOT IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE CONTRACT 
WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING IS ·CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE WHI•CH IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT DE-
FENDANTS WERE DELINQUENT A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN 
P A Yl\'IEN'TS. 
Although the record in this matter gives little solace 
to one attempting to ascertain how the trial court reached 
the conclusions it did, certain elements stand out as 
guideposts. 
A complaint was filed praying for a declaration of a 
forfeiture of Defendants rights in the agreement and the 
assets described therein. No ans"\ver was filed by De-
fendants, but Defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment casts son1e light upon their position. They prayed 
for summary judgment on the basis that the contract 
was valid and subsisting and that Defendants were not 
in default thereunder (R. 19). 
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An affidavit of one of Defendants sets forth some 
of the 1naterial one 'vould expect to find in an answer. 
These are (1) a denial that Defendants had exhausted 
the fifteen weeks grace period, and ( 2) denial that De-
fendants failed to make the payments that became due 
on August lOth and 17th, 1959. Apart from these two 
points, Defendants requested a trial to put in evidence 
on other points of the case (R. 21). 
The findings and conclusions of the trial court go 
far afield from the points raised by Defendants' motion, 
but in part find that there was no default and that the 
contract was valid and subsisting. This was erroneous 
based upon the uncontradicted evidence before the trial 
court, and "varrants a reversal of the order of the trial 
court granting Defendants' motion for summary judg-
lnent. 
The contract is clear that the $100.00 weekly pay-
nlents were to commence the 1st day of September, 1958. 
Defendants were accorded a cumulative fifteen weeks 
grace period. It is apparent that the Defendants elected 
to take immediate advantage of the fifteen "Teeks grace 
period, because no payments vvere made from the time 
of execution of the contract in June, 1958, until the 8th 
day of Dece1nber, 1958. Then the sum of $300.00 was 
pajd for the paYinents due September 1, 8 and 15, 1958. 
A glance at the calendar and use of simple arithmetic 
will establish that all payments thereafter ''"'ere fifteen 
weeks delinquent, to the end of the accorded grace p·eriod 
(Ex. P-3). The last payment was made on July 27, 1959, 
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and \Yas for the installment due April13, 1959. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the checks given 
on August 10, 1959, for pay1nents due April 20 and 27, 
1959, and ~Iay 4, 1959, were refused and dishonored by 
Defendants' bank (Ex. P-1; Ex. P-2; Deposition of l{eith 
Sudbury, Pages 10-17). 
The record is barren of contradiction that Defend-
ants were then in arrears eighteen payments totalling 
$1,800.00, and were therefore in default. 
Before any further payments were tendered by De-
fendants, Plaintiffs delivered written notice of default 
(Ex. P-4). 
The ruling of the trial court that the contract was 
valid and subsisting and that Defendants were not in 
default is contrary to all of the evidence and is erroneous. 
POINT TWO 
THE JUDGMENT, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT ENTIRELY IGNORES THE COVE-
NANT OF DEFENDANTS NOT TO SUE NOR DEFEND ON 
THE GROUND OF FORFEITURE. 
The trial court in its summary judgment determined 
that the forfeiture provision was unenforceable. In order 
to do this, it ignored what the parties declared to be 
an "indispensable'' part of the consideration for the 
agreement: an express covenant not to sue nor raise 
the defense of forfeiture. 
The contact provides: 
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"* * * in consideration of sellers' consenting 
that buyers' assets shall not be a1nenable to pro-
cess by sellers in the event of default by buyers 
that buyers hereby covenant and agree that jn 
the event of default and an election by sellers 
to proceed under the terms of the foregoing for-
feiture provision that buyers \vill never raise nor 
assert as a defense to any such action the defense 
of forfeiture, and they hereby expressly waive 
and covenant not to claim as their own any rights 
in any of said property * * * ; that each party to 
this agreement understands that Courts do not 
favor forfeitures, but that each party consents 
that an indispensable part of the consideration 
for the terms of this agreement is that buyers 
covenant not to sue or defend upon the theory of 
forfeiture and they do hereby expressly waive 
and consent not to assert such right." 
A covenant not to sue is universally recognized and 
uniformly enforced. 45 A1n. Jur., Release, Section 3. 
The Restatement of the Lavv of ·Contracts phrases 
the rule as follows : 
"Section 405. CONTRACT NOT TO SUE. 
"(1) A contract by which one party prom-
ises never to· sue the other party, or a third person 
for the enforcement of a specific right, or not to 
do so for a limited time, bars an action for that 
purpose during any agreed time * * *" 
The enforceability of a covenant not to sue is tested 
by the same standards as are determinative for any 
other type of contract. If the ele1nents of an enforceable 
contract are found to be present in a covenant not to 
sue, the covenant not to sue is enforceable. 
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In this case \Ve have t\vo parties, eo1npetent to 
eontract, "·ho in clear and explicit terins, contracted with 
regard to a subject matter as to "Thich they \vere free 
to contract. The 1nutual assent of both is clear from 
the language used. There \vas an independent considera-
tion given by Plaintiffs for Defendants' promise not to 
raise the defense of forfeiture. There is no tinge of 
illegality or in1position involved in their agree1nent. The 
covenant not to sue thus meets all the requisites for the 
forElation of a valid and enforceable contract. 12 Am . 
.T ur. p. 509, ·Contracts, Section 16. 
The rights of the parties \Vhich \vere exchanged in 
connection with the covenant not to sue certainly repre-
sent a fair exchange of values. Plaintiffs gave up the 
very valuable right to look to the personal assets of 
Defendants for the enforcement of Defendants' promise 
to pay the agreed purchase price for the business. De-
fendants, with full kno\vledge that courts disfavor for-
feitures agreed not to invoke this attitude of the Courts 
if Plaintiffs had need to enforce the forfeiture provision. 
By giving effect to the covenant not to sue, as the 
trial court should properly have done, it only remained 
for the court to consider whether or not there had been 
a default in the prescribed payments and an election 
by Plaintiffs to proceed under the forfeiture provision. 
As discussed above in Point I, there can be no 
question that Defendants were in default in their pay-
ments. Further Plaintiffs notified Defendants on August 
17, 1959 that they would accept no further installment 
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pay1nents, and demanded payn1ent of the full balance 
due under the contract (Exh. P-4). When Defendants 
did not pay the balance by September 11, 1959, Plaintiffs 
notified Defendants that they were electing to pursue 
the forfeiture provision unless full payment was n1ade 
within 30 days thereafter (Exh. P-5). When the contract 
balance was not paid by November 10, 1959, this suit 
'vas commenced for declaration of the forfeiture. This 
clearly manifests an election by Plaintiffs of the remedy 
they were pursuing. 
The trial court's complete disregard of the covenant 
not to sue clearly invades a very sacred right of human 
endeavor - the freedom and right to contract. 
The right of private contract is no small part of 
liberty of citizens, and the function of the courts is to 
maintain and enforce contracts rather than enable parties 
to escape their obligations. 
That principle is repeatedly announced by the courts. 
12 Am. J ur., Contracts, Section 172; McCallum v. 
Campbell-S~mpson Motor Company, Idaho 1960, 349 P. 
2nd 986; J. R. Simplot Company v. Chambers, Idaho 
1960, 350 P 2nd 211. 
It is respectfully urged that the judgment of trial 
court in derogation of the express terms of the contract 
not to sue or defend was erroneous and should be re-
versed. 
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POINT THREE 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE 
FORFEITURE PROVISION OF THE ·CONTRACT IS UN-
ENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS ERRONEOUS. 
Appellants believe the covenant not to sue or defend 
on the ground of forfeiture prevents Defendants from 
defending that the forfeiture provision of the agreement 
is not enforceable. 
IIowever, even without the covenant not to sue, the 
forfeiture provision itself, when viewed in the light of 
all the circumstances of the case, is the only effective 
remedy which Plaintiffs have under the contract, and 
the court therefore erred in summarily ruling as a matter 
of law that it was uneforceable. 
19 Am. J ur., 102, Equity, Section 93, sets out the law 
respecting enforcement of forfeitures as follows: 
"While the law does not favor forfeitures, 
and since all ambiguities in a contract are to be re-
solved against their existence, it is not to be sup-
posed that a court of equity will lightly dispense 
with contracts made between competent parties 
and substitute therefor other agreements more in 
accordance with variable rules of right and con-
science, thus preventing them from having that 
which was made by them the very e·ssence of their 
agreement. Courts in general have not gone so 
far as to hold that equity can relieve from the 
consequences of the breach of a condition when-
ever it stands as security for the performance of 
some act. Forfeitures are not p·er se unlawful, 
and if a contract in unmistakable terms p,rovides 
for . a forfeiture, is otherwise free from legal in-
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firnuty, and the act secured against is of the 
essence of the contract, neither a court of equity 
nor a court of law will relieve against the for-
feiture.'' 
In the case of Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 
2d 623, this court said: 
"In the absence of fraud or imposition, the 
parties are bound by the price or measure of value 
they have agreed on, and such p·rice must be paid 
notwithstanding it may be excessive. The courts 
cannot supervise decisions made in the business 
world and grant relief when the bargain proves 
improvident.'' 
In the case of Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P. 2d 
712, the court further ackno,vledged the right of persons 
to contract freely, stating at page 717: 
"It is not our prerogative to step in and re-
negotiate the contract of the parties. It may he 
conceded that with an advantaged background ,,~e 
may be able to improve on their work and con-
sidering the changed times and conditions say 
what now appears to us to be fair under such 
conditions. Possibly at least one of the parties 
would agree. There is no reason why we should 
consider the vendee privileged and entitled to our 
intervention unless the conditions sought to be 
imposed on the vendee are unconscionable. Equity 
should not indulge in refinements and exact valu-
ations at a time subsequent to the breach or re-
cission, further than to determine if enforcement 
of the contract results in gross inequity, and un-
less and until the enforce1nent would be highly 
unconscionable, we should recognize and honor 
the right of persons to contract freely and to 
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1nake real and genuine Inistakes '''"hen the deal-
ings are at arms' length. It will be conceded, "\Ve 
think, that where a seller seeks not only his pound 
of flesh but likewise a goodly supply of blood he 
should not be indulged. 
Nor should we fail to observe how many pur-
chasers have made most advantageous bargains 
and when the contracts have run have secured 
property three times what the poor sellers re-
ceived under their contracts. Should not equity, 
if we are going paternalistic, under the same 
tokens say to such a buyer, You can't do this to 
the poor seller-the property to which he still 
holds title is now worth two or three times what 
you are paying him and that is unconscionable; 
you will be required to pay more than the contract 
calls for in order that he be· not required to give 
a deed to property worth three times what he is 
being paid." 
By application of the foregoing pronouncements to 
the case at bar, we, also, find a situation in which the 
forfeiture provision should be enforceable. 
We have parties standing on equal footing and deal-
ing at arms' length. There is no fiduciary relationship 
between them. Neither is under disability. There is no 
suggestion or claim of fraud in the inducement or execu-
tion of the agreement. The business experience of each 
had been a common one. 
The parties parted. They agreed that Defendants 
should purchase Plaintiffs' interest. The sale was of an 
interest in a going business, but there were certain tang-
ible assets to which Defendants needed unencumbered 
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title in order to borrow money to continue the business. 
The agreement, therefore, constituted a present convey-
ance of all tangible assets. 
Because Defendants desired to borrow money on the 
business assets and were unwilling to make an unquali-
fied promise to pay the purchase price, the contract, of 
necessity, assumed some unique characteristics as com-
pared to an ordinary sales contract. 
Thus, at Defendants' insistence, the following pro-
visions came into the agreement: 
(a). Title to all of the assets of the business 
passed immediately to Defendants; 
(b). Plaintiffs were to have a chattel mortgage 
as security for the agreed purchase price; however, 
the chattel mortgage was expressly subordinated to 
additional financing arrangements, unlimited 1n 
amount, which Defendants might later desire to 
make (R. 7). 
(c). Defendants had the absolute and un-
trammeled right to trade or substitute chattels with-
out Plaintiffs' consent (R. 7); 
(d). Defendants' promise to pay the purchase 
p·rice was enforceable only against business assets, 
with personal liability against Defendants having 
been expressly waived by Plaintiffs (R. 8); 
(e). Defendants were not required to make 
any payment whatever for three months after the 
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contract \vas signed. In addition, Defendants were 
given a fifteen week grace period for making pay-
ments (R. 6). 
The agreement spelled out two alternative remedies 
for Plaintiffs in event of Defendants' default. The first 
"~as the right to declare the full amount of the purchase 
price due and proceed to foreclose on the mortgage. The 
second was the right to declare forfeiture of the business 
to Plaintiffs, subject to the obligation and duty of Plain-
tiffs to pay all creditors of Defendants, (R. 8-9), \vhich, 
implicitly, would forestall the creditors of Defendants 
fro1n enforcing their presumed right to deficiency judg-
ments against Defendants. Either of these remedies were 
made available, at Plaintiffs' option. 
Since Defendants were permitted to borrow undeter-
mined and unlimited amounts from others, using the 
chattels as security, with Plaintiffs' rights being subor-
dinated to any such financing, the security of a chattel 
mortgage on the physical assets of the business immedi-
ately became illusory and of no benefit whatever in pro-
tecting Plaintiffs' right to receive the promised pTice. 
Resort to an example will graphically illustrate the 
fairness of the forfeiture provision. As stated, Defend-
ants had total power to encumber the property, coupled 
with an entire absence of personal responsibility for any 
deficiency. Thus, if Defendants were to borrow the full 
resale value of the assets, as can be done, and Defendants 
then defaulted, Plaintiffs could recoveT nothing by way 
of mortgage foreclosure. They would get nothing since 
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there can be no personal judgment against Defendants 
under this contract. In such a situation the ability to 
take over a going business would give plaintiffs a chance 
to salvage their investment. This could only be accon1-
plished by resort to the forfeiture provision. 
Obviously, "\vithout full efficacy being given to the 
forfeiture provision as "\vritten, Plaintiffs are without 
any security whatsoever. 
Is it then unconscionable for Plaintiffs to declare a 
forfeiture of the business, take it back and operate it in 
an atte1npt to pay off any secured or other business cred-
itors that Defendants Inay have, and if they succeed in 
this, thereafter attempt to recoup their money~ 
The trial court ruled that such a forfeiture is void as 
a matter of law. Significantly, it so ruled 'vhen there 
'vas no evidence "\vhatever that total encumbrance in 
favor of other creditors 'vas not the precise status of the 
business at the time forfeiture vvas declared. 
If such were the fact, and there is no evidence other-
'vise, the court took from Plaintiffs the entire balance of 
the purchase price, less 'vhatever sum the conscience of 
Defendants dictates they should pay to Plaintiffs. 
In addition to the language of the contract that the 
forfeiture provision is indispensable, the above analysis 
of the operation of the contract demonstrates that the 
forfeiture provision is the total essence thereof. There 
is not another element of the entire contract upon which 
protection to Plaintiffs is more dependent. 
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The action of the trial court not only eliminated the 
freedon1 of these parties to contract, but it re,vrites their 
entire agreement, giving all to a defaulting buyer, giving 
nothing to an unsecured seller. 
The trial court's gratuitious ''revision" is more 
unconscionable with respect to the rights of the seller 
than the Inost drastic forfeiture provisons could ever be. 
If the trial court is to be permitted to rewrite the 
contract, deleting provisions inserted by the parties for 
valuable consideration, and of the utmost importance 
to each at the time of execution, it should also be re-
quired to give back the considerations relinquished In 
exchange for the deleted and ignored provisions. 
It should be obliged to insert a provision granting 
Plaintiffs the right to deficiency judgment. 
It should p-rohibit Defendants from encumbering or 
disposing of the physical assets of the business at will 
and compel Defendants to remove those encumbrances. 
And to logically proceed, it should be comp·elled 
to prevent Plaintiffs sustaining a loss on the sale, by 
requiring Defendants to pay back to Plaintiffs their 
full original investment of $42,500.00, not merely the 
$36,200.00 agreed upon. 
It is obvious that if the trial court had rewritten 
the contract to so assist sellers, this court would not 
pause for a moment in blue penciling such additions. 
As has been aptly stated in the Utah case of Peck 
vs. Judd, supra, courts refuse to interfere with advan-
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tageous bargains made by purchasers. The doctrine of 
mutuality of contract dictates and demands that the 
same p·rescription be applied against interference with 
the rights of sellers. 
Note should be taken of the attitude of Defendants 
with respect to this agreement. Having been given three 
months before any payments were required of them, and 
an additional fifteen week grace period during the life 
of the contract, Defendants consciously and callously 
elected to exhaust the entire grace period during the 
first months of the contract, thereby courting peril and 
flirting with forfeiture. They should not now be heard 
to complain. 
Defendants urge, the most literal interpretation of 
the contract, insofar as that could result in benefit to 
themselves; but they urge the court to completely ignore 
the contract in those respects where a benefit may inure 
to Plaintiffs. 
Evidence of this fact is the tender of money De-
fendants made in court. Ostensibly, this ·w .. as to bring the 
contract current. Actually, these tenders \Vould bring 
the contract back to the point of not being in default; 
but continuing the fifteen week grace period exhausted. 
It is submitted that it is not conscionable that De-
fendants be permitted to put Plaintiffs in a position 
where they are obliged to pay their obligation only out 
of the assets of the business, which assets can be \Yholly 
removed from Plaintiffs' reach by Defendants, and in 
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a cavalier Inanner, fail to make eighteen instalhnent pay-
ments, give Plaintiffs two bad checks, leave the country 
for Europe, and then complain that the covenant given 
for ample and valuable consideration, not to sue nor 
raise the defense of forfeiture in event of default should 
not be enforced. 
Finally, it should be noted that since the notice of 
default was given to Defendants, Plaintiffs have never-
theless been vvilling to accept the full contract balance 
due them in the sum of $23,500.00 together with interest 
to date (Exh. P-4; P-5). That was and is a courtesy 
extended by Plaintiffs which was not required of them. 
It demonstrates that Plaintiffs have at all times acted 
in good faith vvith regard to the obligation. The election 
of Plaintiffs to forfeit this contract is not an attempt 
to take undue advantage of Defendants, but as demon-
strated above, it represents the only effective remedy 
Plaintiffs could ever pursue to protect their rights 
under the contract. 
The trial court's ruling that forfeiture is an unen-
forceable remedy effectively destroys any contract right 
\vhich Plaintiffs had, and was error. 
POINT FOUR 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ACCELERATE 1THE 
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THAT DEFENDANTS MADE 
A VALID TENDER ARE IMMATERIAL AND CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiffs do not now, and never have, contended 
that they accelerated the contract balance for the pur-
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poses of foreclosure. In good faith, and as an unrequired 
courtesy, they merely extended to Defendants an op-
portunity to pay in full to avoid forfeiture (Exh. P-5 ). 
If it is claimed that Plaintiffs were required to 
accelerate for purposes of forfeiture, they have done so 
(Exh. P-4 and P-5). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING AND 
ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT T·o SUPPORT ITS CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
1nakes it n1andatory that in all actions tried without 
jury, the court must find specifically, as well as sep-
arately, the facts which constitute ground for decision 
(53 Am. J ur. Trials, Section 1133). 
The findings contain statements to the effect that 
this agree1nent "\vas a chattel mortgage, not a conditional 
sales contract, 'vhich findings are actually conclusions 
of law unsupported by any evidence or findings of fact. 
The findings state that Defendants were not in de-
fault. The finding is wholly unsupported by the evide~ce, 
and in fact is a conclusion of la"~, barren of the requisite 
base of evidence. 
There is nothing In the findings authorizing the 
conclusion that the forfeiture provision of the contract 
should not he enforced. There is no finding of fraud. 
None of imposition. None of gross inequity. None of 
unconscionable advantage nor injury to the public. 
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The judgrnent of the trial court that the forfeiture 
provision of the contract is unforceable is unsupported 
by any finding, and is consequently erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Intelligent parties dealt at ar1ns' length. One said 
''I will buy your interest in your business if, but only if, 
you will agree that I may pay you from the proceeds 
of that business. If I do not pay you as I now agree 
to do, you may look to that business only for your 
money, not to me." 
The other party, knowing of his great risk and 
hazard, consented, but stated: "I agree. But because 
of that concession to you, you must agree that if you 
don't pay me, you will give me back my interest and 
g1ve me your own interest as well." The other party 
agreed. 
These contractually competent people then discussed 
a method whereby they could make known their desires 
that they be permitted by the courts to contract and 
agree in the way that they both conceded was fair. 
One of them gave away a valuable pToperty right, 
to wit, the substantive entitlement to security and de-
ficiency. In exchange, the other party promised that if 
he did not pay that he would then give the entire 
operation back, subject, however to all the debt.s he 
might in the future incur in his attempts to operate 
the business. 
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Both of these people desired the arrangement. They 
both knew that if a dispute should arise, the person 
who agreed to give back what he had acquired, plus his 
own interest, would then have available to him the possi-
ble defense that courts abhor and sometimes do not en-
force forfeitures. 
Knowing that, they then, within the limitations im-
posed by language as expressive of intent, framed words 
that say: 
"We are now in agreement. We do not know which 
of us made a bad bargain or a good bargain. Retro-
spection, only, will tell us. But, if \Ve ever get in the 
courts on this, our agreement, we both desire that the 
court that may then judge us will know that we desire 
to be judged on our state of minds existing on the day 
we drew our agreement. 
"That is, both being fair, we know that forfeitures 
are not favored. We will spell that out for one purpose 
-so that the courts, if need be, \vill have the good sense, 
with clear conscience, to recognize our capacities and 
intentions and give credit to our integrity by enforcing 
our agreement in accord with our desires as we have 
expressed them and which we now agree are fair." 
The covenant not to assert as a defense the precept 
of forfeiture should be enforced. 
Were the shoe on the other foot, would Plaintiffs 
be heard to complain that Defendants offended the pub-
lic and this court by making Plaintiffs "\\7aive rights to 
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deficiency~ Of course not. That position is ridiculous. 
To deny Plaintiffs forfeiture would be to offend 
conscience, destroy mutuality and make a mockery of 
freedom of contract. 
The judgment of the trial court on Defendants 
motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and 
the case remanded with directions to enter judgment 
for plaintiffs on their complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIDWELL, REYNOLDS & 
·CUTHBERT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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